A Test of Perpetual R&D Races

by

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Abstract: This paper presents an experimental study of dynamic indefinite horizon R&D races with uncertainty and multiple prizes. The theoretical predictions are highly sensitive: small parameter changes determine whether technological competition is sustained over time or converges into a market structure with an entrenched leadership and lower aggregate R&D research. The subjects’ strategies are far less sensitive. In three out of four treatments (with the exception being a control treatment), the R&D races tend to converge to entrenched leadership. Investment is highest when rivals are close, and there is evidence of average over-investment.

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1. Introduction

In a number of industries firms compete by innovation in perpetual races without clear finishing lines. When a firm is ahead in the race, it earns higher rewards than the lagging firms, e.g. a higher product quality might imply a higher price mark-up or larger market share. Conversely, it earns lower rewards when overtaken. We find, for example, such market structures in the pharmaceutical (Cockburn and Henderson, 1994), disk drive (Lerner, 1987) and semiconductor (Gruber, 1994) industries. These industries typically involve gradual innovations. Technology progresses in incremental steps rather than leaps, thereby rendering patents less crucial in defining relative market positions. Also, innovations affecting relative market positions can occur in terms of production processes rather than the product per se.

This paper presents an experimental test of behaviour in perpetual R&D races. The literature contains several game theoretic models describing perpetual races. For instance, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) find that the leader would remain unchallenged in a model where progress steps occur with probability one for the firm that invests most. Reinganum (1983) find that the leader would be overtaken in a model where the leader enjoys a monopoly position (as the leader has less incentive to invest than the follower). In Hörner’s (2004) model, both of these effects drive investments: leaders want to kill the rivalry of followers when sufficiently ahead (to get them to give up first), and followers want to prevent this when sufficiently behind (such that the leader would relax first). These effects do not necessarily weaken as the gap increases (e.g. leaders may be best off defending their positions only if the lead is sufficiently large). In contrast, Aghion et al. (1997) present a framework where the closer competitors are to one another, the higher the R&D investment. It therefore appears that equilibrium predictions of R&D races – if they exist – can differ qualitatively depending on the context in which the race takes place.
Some empirical studies provide weak support for the feasibility of equilibrium analyses in the case of R&D races (e.g. Meron and Caves, 1991; Cockburn and Henderson, 1994). Part of the problem may be in ignoring internal and external economies of scale (Cockburn and Henderson, 1996), but Cohen and Levin (1989) note the limitations of existing field studies: measuring strategic behaviour is difficult and thus attempts are often imprecise, while R&D motivations are varied. If the specifics of the R&D races can also have a significant impact on outcomes, as shown by Hörner (2004), and are hard to measure, this makes drawing implications from field studies still more difficult.

Our experimental approach addresses these problems by studying a controlled environment that measures strategic behaviour precisely; as such, it may complement field studies. The variety of races we consider falls under the general framework introduced by Hörner (2004). Along the equilibrium paths, different market structures and investment levels are predicted. Hörner’s model combines aspects of Aoki’s (1991) model where rewards are assigned every time period (round) for being ahead in the race with aspects of Harris and Vickers’s (1987) model where there are non-deterministic probabilities of success dependent on R&D investment levels. Players discount future payoffs – as usual the discount factors can also be interpreted as continuation probabilities – to model an indefinite rather than infinite horizon race. The derived theoretical predictions provide benchmarks of strategic behaviour; thus, we can compare actual behaviour against these benchmarks.

As we move from race to race (treatment to treatment), we change only one variable at a time, and thus obtain closely comparable races. Thanks to the generality of Hörner’s framework, this is sufficient to obtain qualitatively different equilibrium predictions. For instance, for one of the parameter sets the theory predicts a reflecting behavioural pattern, where both R&D companies tend to stay in the race for an indefinite time horizon (i.e. the
leader is first to give up exerting high effort, allowing the laggard to catch up). For another set, an absorbing behavioural pattern where leaders invest more than followers is predicted; the market degenerates into what we may label an R&D leadership monopoly, a state with entrenched leadership (as the laggard is first to give up exerting high effort) and lower aggregate investment.

We can then investigate whether technological competition is as sensitive to the strategic context as predicted by theory, and, if not, whether technological competition is sustainable with time or not. To increase its empirical value, the experiment was designed to reduce (as far as possible) the cognitive requirements on the side of the subjects. Treatment parameters were generally symmetric and led to unique symmetric equilibria in pure strategies (which implies comparably low cognitive requirements for equilibrium play). The extensive amount of repetition in our two-hour experiment allowed subjects to accumulate more experience in handling the task, compared to those in experiments on traditional patent race models (e.g. Zizzo, 2002; Kähkönen, 2005).

Section 2 describes the theoretical framework, defines the equilibrium concept, and derives the equilibrium predictions for the races implemented in the laboratory. Section 3 reports the experimental design and results. Section 4 concludes.

2. Theoretical Aspects

2.1 The Model

In this section, we define the model underlying our study, derive some characteristics required to calculate equilibria, and present the predictions for our experimental treatments. We closely follow Hörner's (2004) definitions and approach, apart from adopting symmetric parameters (allowing us to simplify some notation).

The set of players is $B \in \{1,2\}$. They play for an infinite number of rounds. In each round $t \in N$, they simultaneously choose whether to exert
either high effort (H) or low effort (L). Their effort can lead to Success (S) or Failure (F). For any player \( i \), high effort leads to Success with probability \( \alpha_H \), and low effort leads to Success with probability \( \alpha_L < \alpha_H \). These probabilities are the same for both players and constant throughout the game. The cost of exerting high effort is denoted by \( c > 0 \) (which is equal for both players), and the cost of exerting low effort is normalized to 0.

The state \( k_i \) of the game in round \( t \) is the difference of the total number of Successes of player 2 and those of player 1, computed over all rounds \( t' < t \). In \( t = 0 \), the difference is equal to zero (this assumption is irrelevant with respect to the set of subgame perfect equilibria). Thus, the state space is \( \mathbb{Z} \) (the set of integers). We say that player 2 is ahead when the state is positive, \( k_i > 0 \), and player 1 is ahead when \( k_i < 0 \). Player \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) is behind if and only if \( j \neq i \) is ahead. When \( k_i = 0 \), Player 1 is ahead or behind with equal probability. In each round \( t \), player \( i \) realizes the (normalized) payoff \( R > 0 \) when he is ahead and the payoff \( -R \) when he is behind. \( R \) is the same for both players, and players discount future payoffs by \( \delta \). Note that \( \delta \) is implemented by the experimental design, and so it is symmetric.

Players are assumed to play Markov strategies. The strategy of \( i \) is a function \( \tau_i : \mathbb{Z} \to [0, 1] \). The value \( \tau_i(k) \) is the probability that \( i \) exerts high effort in state \( k \). The space of Markov strategies of \( i \) is denoted as \( \mathcal{M}_i \). The probability of Success of player \( i \) in state \( k \) under strategy \( \tau_i \) is \( \sigma_i^k = \tau_i(k)\alpha_H + (1 - \tau_i(k))\alpha_L \). Based on this, we can define the probability of being in state \( k \) in round \( t \), evaluated in round 0 under the strategy profile \( \tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2) \). It is denoted \( \pi_i(k | \tau) \); we skip an explicit formulation. Given the strategy \( \tau_i \), the instantaneous rewards of player \( i \) in state \( k \) are

\[
r_i(k, \tau_i) = \tau_i(k) \cdot c + \text{sign}(k) \cdot R \cdot \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } i = 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } i = 2 \end{cases}
\]
The players are assumed to be risk-neutral and to maximize the discounted expected rewards, the overall payoff. The overall payoff of player $i$ under the strategy profile $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2)$ is

$$V_i(\tau) = (1 - \delta) \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \pi_i(k | \tau) r_i(k, \tau_i)$$

Note that the overall payoff is normalized and it is evaluated based on state zero. The overall payoff if the current state is $k \in Z$ is denoted $V_i(\tau | k)$, and can be defined similarly through an expected payoff calculation. A strategy $\tau_i$ is called best response to $\tau_j$ in state $k$ if it maximizes $V_i(\tau_i, \tau_j | k)$. A profile $(\tau_i, \tau_j)$ of mutual best responses in state $k = 0$ constitutes a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies. Finally, a profile $(\tau_i, \tau_j)$ of mutual best responses for all states $k \in Z$ is called Markov perfect equilibrium.

In our experiment, the transition probabilities are generally positive. As a result, for all strategy profiles and all states $k$, the probability that $k$ is observed at least once in the remainder of the game is positive, too. Thus, the set of Markov perfect equilibria is generally equivalent to the set of Nash equilibria, i.e. the solutions for our cases do not require conceptual assumptions beyond Nash reasoning (in the Markov framework of Hörner) and the respective predictions appear conceptually robust.

### 2.2 On the Calculation of Equilibria

Hörner (p. 1070) recognized that it is a "non-trivial exercise" to compute the equilibria. In general, the set of equilibria is not a singleton and there is no characterization of the equilibria (let alone an algorithm to calculate them). In what follows, we outline our approach to calculate the set of equilibria, without the need to rely on a general characterization. First, we derive results that provide a background for an equilibrium analysis. We then present the calculations of the equilibria for the chosen experimental parameters. In the following, we simplify the notation slightly. On the one hand, we concentrate
on statements about the valuation function of player 2; loosely speaking, the corresponding perspective of player 1 results after negating the state \( k \) (see Hörner). On the other hand, for a given strategy profile \( \tau \), the valuation of state \( k \) by player 2 is denoted as \( V_2^*(k) \).

Hörner showed that all Markov perfect equilibria are subgame perfect. Hence, a strategy profile may not be a Markov perfect equilibrium when there exists a profitable deviation to a non-Markovian strategy (the latter then implies that there exists a profitable deviation to a Markov strategy). Fix a state \( k \) and consider a strategy profile where player 2 exerts high effort in \( k \). Consequently, his valuation \( V_2^H(k) \) of state \( k \) satisfies

\[
V_2^H(k) = \alpha_H (1 - \sigma_1^k \delta V_2(k+1) + (1 - \alpha_H) (1 - \sigma_1^k \delta V_2(k) + (1 - \alpha_H) \sigma_1^k \delta V_2(k-1) + (\text{sign}(k) * R - c) (1 - \delta)
\]

If player 2 deviates to low effort in \( k \) for a single round, but sticks to the assumed Markov strategy in the future, then his expected payoff (in state \( k \)) is

\[
V_2^L(k) = \alpha_L (1 - \sigma_1^k \delta V_2(k+1) + (1 - \alpha_L) (1 - \sigma_1^k \delta V_2(k) + (1 - \alpha_L) \sigma_1^k \delta V_2(k-1) + (\text{sign}(k) * R) (1 - \delta)
\]

Player 2 is better off deviating if \( V_2^H(k) - V_2^L(k) < 0 \), which is equivalent to

\[
(1 - \sigma_1^k)(V_2(k+1) - V_2(k)) + \sigma_1^k (V_2(k) - V_2(k-1)) < \frac{c}{\alpha_H - \alpha_L} \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \tag{1}
\]

In turn, if the strategy profile in question implies that player 2 exerts low effort in \( k \), then he is better off deviating to high effort if \( V_2^H(k) - V_2^L(k) > 0 \). Otherwise, he would not deviate in state \( k \), and the strategy profile in question may be an equilibrium.

In order to evaluate Eq. (1), we require information about the valuation function \( V_2 \). In general, the exact values cannot be obtained, as it would require the solution of an equation system with infinite dimension (in particular, this applies in our case, where the transition probabilities are
positive the players discount future payoffs significantly). However, arbitrarily precise upper and lower bounds can be obtained by reducing the infinite to a finite equation system through cutting off extreme states. This requires that the valuation function is monotonic for sufficiently high and low states. Hörner showed that the payoff functions are monotonically increasing over all states in every equilibrium, but in order to show that specific strategy profiles are equilibria, we cannot use this result. In the following, we establish the conditions for the payoff functions to be monotonic that we use later. In Lemma 1, we fix a state $k > 0$ and show that if player 2 does not exert high effort in states $k' \geq k$, then his valuation function is monotonic in those states. Lemma 2 contains a similar result for states $k < 0$.

**Lemma 1** Assume $\alpha_H, \alpha_L \in (0,1)$ and there exists a $k > 0$ such that $\tau_2(k') = 0 \forall k' \geq k$. Then, for all $\tau_1$, $V_2(\tau_1, \tau_2 | k')$ is increasing in $k'$ for all $k' \geq k$.

**Proof:** Fix a state $k' \geq k$. Let $\rho_i$ denote the probability of the following event under the strategy profile $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$: assuming the current state is $k'$, the state in the next $t-1$ rounds will be some $k'' \geq k'$ and the state in round $t$ (counted from now) will be $k'-1$. Thus, the valuation $V_2(k')$ under $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ satisfies

$$V_2(k') = (1-\delta)R + \delta \sum_{t>0} \rho_t \left((1-\delta^{t-1})R + \delta^{t-1}V_2(k'-1)\right)$$

Clearly, $\rho_t \geq 0 \forall t$ and $V_2(k'-1) < R$. As a result, we have $V_2(k') \geq (1-\delta)R + \delta V_2(k'-1) \geq V_2(k'-1)$. QED

**Lemma 2** Assume $\alpha_H, \alpha_L \in (0,1)$ and there exists a $k < 0$ such that $\tau_2(k') = 0 \forall k' \leq k$. Then, for all $\tau_1$, the following holds: if $V_2(\tau_1, \tau_2 | k+1) > -R$, then $V_2(\tau_1, \tau_2 | k')$ is increasing in $k'$ for all $k' \leq k$ otherwise it is decreasing in $k'$ for all $k' \leq k$. 

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Proof: Fix a state $k' \leq k$. As in the proof of Lemma 1, let $\rho_t$ denote the probability of the following event under the strategy profile $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$: assuming the current state is $k'$, the state in the next $t-1$ rounds will be some $k'' \leq k'$ and the state in round $t$ will be $k'+1$. Thus, the valuation $V_2(k')$ under $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ satisfies

$$V_2(k') = -(1-\delta) R + \delta \sum_{t>0} \rho_t \left( (1-\delta^{t-1})R + \delta^{t-1} V_2(k'+1) \right)$$

Assume first $V_2(k+1) > -R$. As a result, $V_2(k) < -(1-\delta) R + \delta V_2(k+1) < V_2(k+1)$, and also $V_2(k) > -R$. Iteratively, this implies that, for all $k' \leq k$, $V_2(k+1) > V_2(k') > -R$ holds, i.e. $V_2(k')$ is increasing. Secondly, consider the case $V_2(k+1) < -R$. Now, $V_2(k) > -(1-\delta) R + \delta V_2(k+1) > V_2(k+1)$ and $V_2(k) < -R$ are implied, and iteratively applied, this shows that $V_2(k')$ is decreasing in $k'$. QED

These monotonicities allow us to calculate boundaries of the valuation function through solving finite equation systems. Upper bounds shall be denoted $\overline{V}_2$ and lower bounds $\underline{V}_2$. For a given strategy profile $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$, and the derived probabilities $\sigma_i^k$, let us define the following short-hands of the transition probabilities: $m_k^{+1}$ is the probability of moving from state $k$ to $k+1$, $m_k^0$ is the probability of not moving, and $m_k^{-1}$ is the probability of moving to state $k-1$,

$$m_k^{+1} = \sigma_2^k \left( 1 - \sigma_1^k \right), \quad m_k^0 = 1 - \sigma_2^k \left( 1 - \sigma_1^k \right) - \left( 1 - \sigma_2^k \right) \sigma_1^k; \quad m_k^{-1} = \left( 1 - \sigma_2^k \right) \sigma_1^k.$$  

**Proposition 3** Fix a strategy profile $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$ and states $K < \overline{K}$ such that player 2 exerts high effort only in states $k$ satisfying $K \leq k \leq \overline{K}$. Upper boundaries $\overline{V}_2(k)$ of the valuation function of player 2 satisfy the following equation system.
\[
\bar{V}_2(K) = m^l_K \delta R + m^0_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K) + m^{-1}_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K-1) + r(K, \tau_i) \\
\bar{V}_2(k) = m^l_K \delta \bar{V}_2(k+1) + m^0_K \delta \bar{V}_2(k) + m^{-1}_K \delta \bar{V}_2(k-1) + r(k, \tau_i) \quad \forall k : K < k < \bar{K} \\
\bar{V}_2(K) = m^l_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K+1) + m^0_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K) + m^{-1}_K \delta \max\{-R, \bar{V}_2(K)\} + r(K, \tau_i)
\]

**Proof:** This equation system mainly relies on the equation system defining the valuation function. This system is described through

\[
V_2(k) = m^l_K \delta V_2(k+1) + m^0_K \delta V_2(k) + m^{-1}_K \delta V_2(k-1) + r(k, \tau_i) \quad \forall k
\]

When we substitute the values of the valuation function \(V_2\) on the right-hand side with upper bounds, then the left-hand side must not be greater than the right-hand side. As a result, the transformed right-hand side constitutes an upper bound. As an upper bound for \(\bar{V}_2(K+1)\) we use \(R\) (this is a strict upper bound, i.e. it is strictly higher than the actual value; therefore, all upper bounds are strict). As an upper bound for \(\bar{V}_2(K-1)\) we use \(\max\{-R, \bar{V}_2(K)\}\), as shown next, this results from Lemma 2. On the one hand, it was shown that if \(\bar{V}_2(K) > -R\), then \(\bar{V}_2(K-1) < \bar{V}_2(K)\). Hence, if \(\bar{V}_2(K) > -R\), then \(\bar{V}_2(K-1) < \max\{-R, \bar{V}_2(K)\}\) will be satisfied. On the other hand, if \(\bar{V}_2(K) < -R\), then \(\bar{V}_2(K-1) > \bar{V}_2(K)\), but also \(\bar{V}_2(K-1) < -R\) (which is then used). \(\text{QED}\)

**Proposition 4** Fix a strategy profile \((\tau_1, \tau_2)\) and states \(K < \bar{K}\) such that player 2 exerts high effort only in states \(k\) satisfying \(K \leq k \leq \bar{K}\). Lower boundaries \(V_2(k)\) of the valuation function of player 2 satisfy the following equation system.

\[
\bar{V}_2(K) = m^l_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K) + m^0_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K) + m^{-1}_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K-1) + r(K, \tau_i) \\
V_2(k) = m^l_K \delta V_2(k+1) + m^0_K \delta V_2(k) + m^{-1}_K \delta V_2(k-1) + r(k, \tau_i) \quad \forall k : K < k < \bar{K} \\
V_2(K) = m^l_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K+1) + m^0_K \delta \bar{V}_2(K) + m^{-1}_K \delta \min\{-R, \bar{V}_2(K)\} + r(K, \tau_i)
\]

**Proof:** The proof relies on arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 3, and is therefore skipped. \(\text{QED}\)
Notably, these bounds hold regardless of how player 1 moves outside the range of states defined through $\overline{K}$ and $\underline{K}$. The lower bounds for the valuation in some state $k$ may be inefficient if $\overline{K} - k < 2$ and player 2 exerts high effort in state $k$. In this case, the dimension of the equation system should be increased.

2.3 Experimental Predictions

For our experimental parameters, we fixed $R = 0.5$, $c = 1$ (i.e. a revenue-to-cost ratio $R/c = 0.5$), and $\delta = 0.9$ for all treatments, while $\alpha_H$ was 0.5 or 0.9, and $\alpha_L = 0.1$ or 0.25, depending on treatment. $R$ and $c$ are arbitrarily chosen. Our choice of $\delta$ allows for a sufficiently large expected number of rounds to give us a chance to observe the pattern of behaviour over time in this dynamic setting. The four different parameter combinations give rise to equilibrium predictions that are qualitatively similar to those introduced in Hörner (2004). Namely, we have predictions where the equilibrium is (weakly) absorbing, reflecting, either reflecting or absorbing, or one where low effort is exerted throughout. More importantly, we chose only parameter combinations where equilibrium predictions are unique in terms of symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. This avoids the coordination problems that would arise for the subjects if several such equilibria existed.

Below, we present the theoretical predictions for each treatment. Generally, the predictions are obtained in a two-step approach: first, we determine the set of states where high effort is strictly dominated, and employing the derived limits of the strategy space, we then determine the equilibria. Note that high effort is dominated in state $k$ if Eq. (1) is satisfied for all strategy profiles. Exerting low effort will never be dominated. Finally, note that all of the following results rely on solving specific instances of the above equation systems, and can therefore be obtained rather straightforwardly. For
this reason, apart from one illustration, we shall skip presenting the computational details.

**Treatment A:** \( \alpha_H = 0.5 \) and \( \alpha_L = 0.25 \). In this treatment, exerting high effort is iteratively dominated in all states. In iteration 1, we can show that this applies to all states except -1 and 0, and in iteration 2, we can show this for the states -1 and 0. In turn, let us also show that "exerting low effort in all states" is a Markov perfect equilibrium. We do so by showing that Eq. (1) is satisfied for all states \( k \). Let us define

\[
DV_2(k) = \left(1 - \sigma_2^k\right)(V_2(k+1) - V_2(k)) + \sigma_1^k(V_2(k) - V_2(k-1))
\]

Thus, we have to show that \( DV_2(k) < \frac{4}{9} \) for all \( k \). For most states, this is obvious, since \( V_2(0) = 0 \) must hold under the hypothesized strategy profile.

As a result, \( DV_2(k) < \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{2} < \frac{4}{9} \) must hold for all \( k \neq 0 \). In order to show that the players would neither deviate in state \( k = 0 \), boundaries for the payoffs in the states \( k = -1 \) and \( k = 1 \) are required (under the hypothesized strategy profile). We obtain them by solving the above equation systems for \( K = -1 \) and \( \overline{K} = 1 \). Thus, we see that \( V_2(-1) > -\frac{3}{8} \) and \( V_2(1) < \frac{3}{8} \) (conservatively rounded), which implies \( DV_2(0) < \frac{4}{9} \). As an illustration, the following equation system characterizes the upper bounds.

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta V_2(1) = & \frac{3}{16} \delta R + \frac{5}{8} \delta V_2(1) + \frac{3}{16} \delta V_2(0) \\
\delta V_2(0) = & \frac{3}{16} \delta V_2(1) + \frac{5}{8} \delta V_2(0) + \frac{3}{16} \delta V_2(-1) \\
\delta V_2(-1) = & \frac{3}{16} \delta V_2(0) + \frac{5}{8} \delta V_2(-1) + \frac{3}{16} \delta \max\{-R, V_2(-1)\}
\end{align*}
\]

**Treatment B:** \( \alpha_H = 0.9 \) and \( \alpha_L = 0.25 \). We can eliminate high effort in iteration 1 in the states \( k \leq -5 \) and \( k \geq 5 \), in iteration 2 in state \( k = -4 \), and in
iteration 3 in state $k = -3$. High effort in the remaining states is not dominated. The unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies implies to exert high effort in the states $k = -1$ and $k = 2$, and low effort otherwise. To prove this, we have to show that $DV_2(k) > \frac{20}{117}$ in states $k = -1, 2$, and $DV_2(k) < \frac{20}{117}$ otherwise (under the hypothesized strategy profile). When we solve the respective equation systems for $\overline{K} = 4$ and $\underline{K} = 4$, this results immediately. Namely, we obtain $V_2(-2) \approx -0.492$ and $V_2(3) \in (0.363, 0.388)$ (conservatively rounded), which implies $DV_2(k) < \frac{20}{117}$ for $k \leq -3$ and for $k \geq 4$. The remaining bounds are

$$V_2(-1) \approx -0.35 \quad V_2(0) \approx -0.156 \quad V_2(1) \approx -0.054 \quad V_2(2) \in (0.232, 0.253),$$

which is enough information to show that the claimed equilibrium exists. Note that the three approximations are given with an accuracy higher than $10^{-4}$.

**Treatment C:** $\alpha_H = 0.5$ and $\alpha_L = 0.1$. We can eliminate high effort in iteration 1 in the states $k \leq -4$ and $k \geq 5$, in iteration 2 in the states $k = -3, 4$, in iteration 3 in the states $k = -2, 3$, and finally in state $k = 2$. High effort is rationalizable in the states $k = -1, 0, 1$; the unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies is to exert high effort if and only if the state is $k = 0$. Thus, we have to show that $DV_2(k) > \frac{5}{18}$ if and only if $k = 0$. When we solve the equation systems for $\overline{K} = 2$ and $\underline{K} = 2$, we obtain (conservatively rounded)

$$V_2(-1) \in (-0.42, -0.41) \quad V_2(0) \in (-0.26, -0.25) \quad V_2(1) \in (0.22, 0.25) \quad V_2(2) < 0.43$$

This provides the required information.

**Treatment D:** $\alpha_H = 0.9$ and $\alpha_L = 0.1$. We can eliminate high effort in iteration 1 in the states $k \leq -5$ and $k \geq 5$, and in iteration 2 in state $k = -4$. 

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High effort is rationalizable in all other states. The unique symmetric equilibrium implies high effort in the states $k = -2, -1$, and low effort otherwise.

To prove this, we have to show that $DV_2(k) > \frac{5}{36}$ for $k = -2, -1$, and $DV_2(k) < \frac{5}{36}$ otherwise. We calculate the boundaries using equation systems based on $K = -4$ and $\overline{K} = 4$. We obtain, conservatively rounded,

$V_2(-4) < -0.491$, $V_2(-3) \in (-0.468, -0.466)$, $V_2(-2) \approx -0.4058$, $V_2(-1) \approx -0.255$, $V_2(0) \approx -0.0823$, $V_2(1) \approx -0.0114$, $V_2(2) \approx 0.0534$, $V_2(3) \in (0.339, 0.348)$, $V_2(4) \in (0.428, 0.453)$

Here, it appears that the jump in the valuation function from state $k = 2$ to $k = 3$ justifies high effort either in $k = 2$ (to reach the more valuable state $k = 3$) or in state $k = 3$ (to defend it). This impression is misleading. In state $k = 2$, player 1 (who is behind) would exert high effort, which corrupts the chances of player 2 to progress to state $k = 3$. Formally,

$$DV_2(2) < (1 - \alpha_H) * (0.348 - 0.0534) + \alpha_H * (0.0534 + 0.0114) < 0.09 < \frac{5}{36}$$

In state $k = 3$, in turn, player 1 gives up, implying that player 2 needs not to exert high effort any more. Formally,

$$DV_2(3) < (1 - \alpha_L) * (0.453 - 0.339) + \alpha_L * (0.348 - 0.0534) < 0.133 < \frac{5}{36}$$

Similarly, we can show for the other states, that the above strategy profile is an equilibrium.

3. The Experiment

3.1 Experimental Design

The experiment was conducted in June 2005, in the experimental economics laboratory of the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. Besides the experimental instructions and control questionnaires, the experiment was fully computerized. Subjects were students from the faculties of Business Administration and Economics, Cultural Sciences, and
Law. A total of 90 subjects participated in the 9 sessions (with 10 subjects per session). Each session had 10 stages. We conducted three sessions for each condition B, C, and D, comprising of treatment A and one of the other three treatments B, C, or D respectively (discussed above in sub-section 2.3). Subjects were randomly paired at the beginning of each stage.

Each stage ended in a round with a probability of 0.1; this implemented the discount rate of 0.9. To facilitate the use of paired statistical tests, we uniformly applied across sessions a predetermined number of rounds per stage. In the design process, we used a computer program to randomly generate the sequence of number of rounds for each of the ten stages. Each session had a total of 88 rounds, and the breakdown of rounds for each of the 10 stages was 9, 10, 2, 3, 6, 4, 7, 18, 21, 8, respectively. Subjects were informed that each stage ends in each round with a "10%" probability, but were not told the specific number of rounds the experiment entailed.

 Subjects were informed that the probability of success with high effort and low effort might change from stage to stage, but were not told the specific parameters until the respective stage began. We partitioned each session into three parts, with part 1 (stages 1-4) entailing one of the treatments B, C, or D, part 2 (stages 5-6) with the baseline, treatment A, and part 3 (stages 7-10) with the treatment played in part 1. The parameters were shown on the computer display.

At the beginning of each stage, we provided subjects with an initial endowment of 8 experimental points. A high (low) investment cost 1 point (0 points). With each successful investment a subject gained one progress step. The player with more (less) total progress steps accumulated up to the end of that round was then in this sense "ahead" ("behind"). This was visually presented on the computer display with a bar showing their relative positions, as well as labels showing the total number of steps made to date by each player in the pair. Being ahead earned the leader a "high prize" worth 2 points; lagging behind earned the follower a "low prize" of 1 point. These parameters
implement an $R/c$ ratio of 0.5, with $R$ scaled up by 1.5 (i.e. $R=0.5$, $-R+1.5=1$ and $R+1.5=2$) to yield a per round equilibrium payoff of $1.38\pm0.12$ across treatments. In the case of a tie in total progress steps one subject in the pair would earn the high (or low) prize with a 50% probability for that round. The conversion rate was 1 euro per experimental point. Costs incurred and prizes earned accumulated within stages, and were not carried across stages. Subjects were paid according to their earnings in one randomly chosen winning stage, announced only at the end of the experiment.

Subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory. Computer terminals were partitioned to avoid communication by facial or verbal means. Subjects read the experimental instructions and answered a control questionnaire before being allowed to proceed with the tasks. The experimental instructions may be found in Appendix A. Experimental supervisors individually advised subjects with incorrect answers in the questionnaires. Each session lasted about 2 hours. The average earning was 15.87 euros per subject. Subjects were privately paid and left the laboratory one at a time.

3.2 Experimental Results

3.2.1 Stylized Facts

We first give a picture of the data using descriptive statistics and univariate statistical tests, and then present the result of more reliable logistic regressions controlling for both individual level and session level random effects.\(^1\) In what follows we label 'high investment' as 'investment' by a subject in a given round. Average investment in the experiment was 0.669, and did not vary much across treatments: it was 0.686 in the baseline treatment A, and 0.611, 0.706 and 0.683 in treatments B, C and D respectively. Students

\(^1\) Although this is an efficient estimation method that takes into account the possible non-independence of observations both at the individual level and at the session level, we have tried different specifications, and believe that none of our key results are dependent on the specific estimation method. For example, very similar results, found using a simpler logistic regression model with only individual fixed effects, are described in an earlier version of this paper (Breitmoser et al., 2006).
with an economics background may have invested slightly less ($\rho = -0.204, P < 0.06$), while there is no evidence of age or gender effects. Subjects did, in general, change their investment response as the experiment progressed. Figure 1 plots average investment against experimental stage.

**FIGURE 1**
Average investment and experimental stage

![Graphs showing investment against stage for different conditions](image)

Condition B (C, D) had treatment B (C, D, respectively) in stages 1-4 and 7-10 of the experiment. Stages 5 and 6 always had treatment A.

Average investment seemed to decrease with experience. Spearman correlation coefficients between round and stage were negative for all nine sessions ($P < 0.005$). In moving from part 1 to part 3 (i.e., to experienced subjects that played again the same treatment), average investment by
subject increased for 18 subjects, was the same for 10 subjects and decreased for 62 subjects: overall, in each and every session, investment decreased in moving from part 1 to part 3 ($P < 0.005$). However, while in part 1 average investment was 0.806, it was still equal to 0.605 in Part 3; furthermore, the stage 10 increase in average investment, relative to previous stages, reduces the plausibility of the conjecture that investment would drop much more if subjects were given even more experience.

Let $o$ be the total number of successes of a player relative to the co-player, so $o = k$ for player 1 and $o = -k$ for player 2 in each race. In other words, $o$ is a measure of relative position by each player. Figure 2 plots average investment against $o$ (for $o$ in the range with most observations, -3, $\ldots$, 3): Table 1 employs a logistic regression model with individual level and session level random effects with Investment as dependent variable (equal 1 when investment 1, else 0) and with Tie (=1 when players are tied, else 0), Leader (= 1 when the player leads the race, else 0), Positive Gap (equal to $o$ when positive, else equal to 0), Negative Gap (equal to the absolute value of $o$ when $o$ is negative, else equal to 0), Stage (equal to stage number) and Round (equal to round number) as independent variables.
Average investment and relative position

Average investment as a function of relative position $o$, for $o = -3, ..., 3$. 
### Table 1
Logistic regressions of Investment with multi-level random effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment A</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Treatment B</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tie</td>
<td>-0.738</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>Tie</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>-1.431</td>
<td>-4.89</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Gap</td>
<td>-1.762</td>
<td>-4.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Positive Gap</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Gap</td>
<td>-1.243</td>
<td>-3.64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Negative Gap</td>
<td>-1.146</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>Stage</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-5.67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-3.03</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.515</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-432.251</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1013.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment C</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Treatment D</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tie</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>Tie</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>-0.669</td>
<td>-2.81</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Gap</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>Positive Gap</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>-4.41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Gap</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-4.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Negative Gap</td>
<td>-0.401</td>
<td>-4.94</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-5.83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Stage</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-7.45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Round</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-5.24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.171</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.039</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1035.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-938.737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample size: \( n = 900 \) (treatment 1); 2340 (treatments 2, 3 and 4).
Regressions control for session level and individual level random effects. \( P \) values provided are two-tailed.

The results on Stage and Round are largely in line with the univariate analysis. In treatment A, the Positive and Negative gap coefficients imply less effort the bigger the relative gap between the players. In treatment B, a leader one step ahead may invest slightly less than a follower one step behind, but as the lead increases the leader always invests more. In treatment C, the leader invests less when he is one step ahead, the same when he is two steps ahead, and more when he is three or more steps ahead. In treatment D, tied competitors invest the most, with investment becoming smaller the larger the gap is; the leader tends to invest more. Overall, there is a fairly robust across-treatment case for claiming that, the greater the gap between R&D competitors, the lower the investment in R&D.

Is there a tendency for the market to become an R&D leadership monopoly? Figure 2 suggests that, for any given treatment and relative
position, the average investment by the leader is at least as large as that of the follower. While the regression analysis in Table 1 suggests instead that the answer is not positive for treatment A, it also implies that, in the other treatments, the market does tend to become an R&D leadership monopoly as the gap in relative position becomes large. To shed further light on this while controlling for individual propensities to invest, we ran Spearman correlations between Investment and Positive Gap and between Investment and Negative Gap for each subject and treatment. It is then possible to compare, for each subject, the two correlation values and see whether the Positive Gap correlation is higher than the Negative Gap correlation. This would imply that, for any given subject, as a follower he reduces high investment at a quicker pace than as a leader as the relative gap in relative position increases. We find that this is not the case for treatment A, whereas it is so for the other treatments (see Table 2).

**Table 2**
Do subjects as followers reduce investment more quickly than as leaders, as the gap between leaders and followers increases?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Leader’s investment relative to follower’s as gap between two increases</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subjects who are both leaders and followers at some point in a given treatment are included, and Spearman correlations are computed between Positive Gap and investment and between Negative Gap and investment. The table checks whether the (Positive Gap, investment) correlation is higher, the same or lower than the (Negative Gap, investment) correlation for any given. P values are computed using two-tailed Wilcoxon tests.

---

2 As in this treatment there were only two short stages of 6 and 4 rounds each, inferences on long-run dynamics should be read with caution, since large gaps in relative position could not be observed. Specifically, the relative position coefficients appear driven by the single observation where a relative position gap of 4 was observed between leader and follower, and where the follower engaged in high investment while the leader did not.

3 A limitation of this test is that it does not control for session level effects, but, as stated earlier, the regressions in Table 1 do control for both individual level and session level effects. This test is effectively just a simpler illustration of the pattern that we observe in Table 1.
3.2.2 Baseline Model

Rationalizability. We start by making a weak check that agents' behaviour is consistent with some set of beliefs about the co-player's actions, though not necessarily with Hörner's prescription of Markov perfect equilibrium strategies. We expect higher investment when high investment is rationalizable than when it is not. As shown by Table 3, this appears to be the case, and is true for all sessions (P < 0.005).\textsuperscript{4}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationalizability of high investment</th>
<th>Treatment A</th>
<th>Treatment B</th>
<th>Treatment C</th>
<th>Treatment D</th>
<th>All Treatments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.751</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are the percentages of high investment choices classified according to treatment and to whether high investment is rationalizable in the baseline model. Low investment is always rationalizable.

For all treatments but treatment A, rationalizable investments tend to cluster around 0 (with a bias towards leaders), and so the predictive power is unsurprising in the light of the key stylized fact that investment tends to be higher with lower progress gaps. These results are encouraging, but it should be noted that in two treatments out of four -- including treatment 1 where no high investment is rationalizable -- agents still chose apparently non-rationalizable strategies over 50% of the times.

Equilibrium strategies. As we proved in section 2, theory predicts low investment in treatment A. It is also possible to estimate predicted average investment in the other treatments: they are 0.212, 0.331 and 0.206 in

\textsuperscript{4} A similar statistical significance level (P < 0.001) was obtained in logistic regression models (with investment as dependent variable and a rationalizability of investment as independent variable) controlling for session level and individual level random effects.
treatments B, C and D. These values show too little investment relative to the observed values in the 0.6-0.7 range. Overall, theory predicts an average investment equal to 0.221. This is roughly only 1/3 of the observed value (0.669). Furthermore, while the highest observed value (0.706) is in the same treatment for which the largest investment is predicted (0.706), notwithstanding its prediction of zero investment treatment A is not the treatment with the lowest investment. Even with the experienced subjects of part 3, the observed average of 0.605 is way above the predicted value (0.238).

Since there are only two choices available to players each round, we should expect a random predictor to get it right 50% of the times. As shown by Table 4, theory achieves a performance comparable to that of a random predictor for inexperienced (i.e., part 1) subjects in treatment C and for experienced (i.e., part 3) subjects in treatments B and C. In all other cases, theory performs worse than chance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Horner Baseline</th>
<th>Transform 1 Model</th>
<th>Transform 2 Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>0.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>0.717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/c ratio</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2-1.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*R/c ratio* stands for revenue/cost ratio. The extended models are introduced in section 3.2.3.

This overall performance is confirmed by noting that the baseline model does better than chance for 24 subjects, is tied in one case, and does worse than chance for 65 subjects. On aggregate, the baseline model does worse than chance in all sessions (*P < 0.005*).
Agents may make mistakes in experiments. As long as these mistakes are unsystematic, they may not seriously dent the usefulness of the model being tested. Assume that we allow for an $\varepsilon$ fraction of incorrect choices: we may then ask what is the fraction of subjects whose choices, allowing for $\varepsilon$, fit the baseline model.\(^5\) A realistic estimate of the error rate may be in the order of 20%, and we set $\varepsilon = 1/5$. We stretch things further in favour of the baseline model by also considering $\varepsilon = 1/3$, a somewhat less plausible high estimate. Under both $\varepsilon$ values, results are dispiriting. Only 5 subjects out of 90 can be classified as following the baseline model using the $\varepsilon = 1/3$ criterion; only 1 subject out of 90 meets the $\varepsilon = 1/5$ criterion.

We could claim that the model should not be tested with inexperienced subjects. We discarded stages 1 through 4 and tried to classify subjects on the basis of part 2 and 3 (stages 5 through 10) performance. Things improve, but not enough to rescue the model: only 8 out of 90 now meet the $\varepsilon = 1/3$ criterion, with just 2 out of 90 meeting the more realistic $\varepsilon = 1/5$ criterion.

The model may still be useful in predicting a wide array of qualitative patterns across different conditions. However, we noted that in treatment A, investment was neither low nor the lowest relative to the other treatments. Only 2 subjects out of 90 complied with the model exactly; only another 2 invested high less than 20% of the times. Treatment B’s equilibrium has two features: (a) investment as a function of relative position should be bimodal, with one peak in investment by the leader and another peak in investment by follower; (b) the equilibrium should be reflecting, meaning that, as we start from a situation of tie and we move from a gradually more uneven race, the leader is the first to invest less on average relative to a follower. No subject satisfies condition (a). Only 6 out of 30 subjects have a reflecting equilibrium pattern. In treatment D we should also observe reflecting equilibrium

\(^5\) We may ask whether the fraction of subjects classified in each group remains the same across different conditions; if so, this would be a sign of an unsystematic error. This will be checked by Table 5 below.
behaviour, but only 3 out of 30 subjects seemed to comply. As Table 2 shows, if anything treatments B and D provide the strongest evidence of an absorbing equilibrium pattern, with followers reducing their investment more quickly than leaders as the gap between the two increases, and the duopoly tending to collapse into an R&D leadership monopoly. Finally, treatment C is the one treatment where one should observe the strictly highest investment when players are tied (the model predicts zero investment if players are not tied). Only 3 out of 30 subjects satisfy this condition.

More generally, while the treatment parameters were chosen in such a way that we should have observed very different behaviour across treatments, the picture that we saw emerging from Table 1 is one with a degree of robustness. There is a loose correspondence between the fact that treatments B, C and D broadly predict high investment somewhere in the region between \( o = -2 \) and \( +2 \) and the stylized fact from Table 1 that higher investment tends indeed to be observed when the gap between competitors is not large. The details, however, do not seem to match.

### 3.2.3 Objective Functions with a Rivalry Motive

An unexplained stylized fact in our experiment is the prevalent over-investment observed in our experiment. As noted by Cohen and Levin (1989), other motives beyond strategic incentives to invest in innovation may influence investment decisions. Apart from the possible confounds already controlled for with our experimental setup, we postulate that the perpetual race setting elicits a competitive mindset in the minds of (at least some) agents, making them wish to win the high prize more than they would purely on the basis of the monetary payoffs (more details are in Appendix B). By raising the revenue-to-cost ratio \( R/c \), we expect investment to be raised to more realistic levels. R&D teams, like experimental subjects, may be motivated by non-monetary concerns when competing with one another. If so, then by controlling for payoff transformations we can indirectly identify rivalry.
concerns as a motive of innovation behaviour, pointing us in this direction to extend the model. To the extent that R&D teams might be more competitive than what the model, based purely on strategic incentives (monetary payoffs), suggests, an improved model should consider this explicitly.

A troubling feature of this exercise is noted in Appendix B, and is not surprising in the light of the analysis in section 2: for a number of payoff transformations equilibria in all treatments fail to exist. We focus on the two well-differentiated payoff transformations for which equilibria exist throughout: Transform 1 can be obtained with $R/c$ between 1.2 and 1.5, Transform 2 with $R/c = 3$. Transform 1 predicts high investment for a gap between −1 and 2 inclusive in treatment C, and for a gap $o = 0, 1$ in the other treatments. Transform 2 predicts high investment for a gap between −2 and 3 inclusive in treatment C, and for a gap $o = 0, 1, 2$ in the other treatments. Table 4 compares the predictive success for these models with that for the baseline model with $R/c = 0.5$.

High investment is predicted for more cases in the transformed models and so we may expect better predictive power. Qualitatively, however, Transform 1 and 2 lose out on the across-treatments variety of dynamic paths of the baseline model: they uniformly predict regions of high investment clusters where relative progress gaps are not too large.

Transform 1’s and Transform 2’s high investment predictions are skewed towards leaders, but, with this qualification, they seem to provide a better fit than the baseline model with the stylized fact that lower progress

---

6 Unlike Transform 2, Transform 1 can be supported by negative spite parameters in the admissible range for our additive payoff transformation, namely between 0.7 and 1. Appendix B discusses how we found equilibria throughout also with $R/c = 4$, but predictions for this model are identical to those for $R/c = 3$ in all cases except in two instances in treatment A, where its performance is worse.

7 In finding equilibrium predictions for this model, we assume that each agent with a given payoff transformation believes that the co-player also has the same payoff transformation, and that the payoff transformation itself is common knowledge.

8 We checked the rationalizability of high (and low) investment under Transform 1 and 2 for $o = -5, ..., +5$, and found that rationalizability places even less constraints here than with the baseline model. Most notably, high investment in treatment A is always rationalizable with both Transform 1 and 2. Additional details are in Appendix B.
gaps are associated with higher investment. They can also explain why some investment is observed in treatment A. Before going into the more formal analysis of their empirical fit, it is worth noting, though, that given that we modified the theory setup to better fit, *ex post*, the observed data, it is no surprise that a better fit is found. The question is whether Transforms 1 and 2, on their own or in combination with the baseline model, achieve more than just embodying the intuition that led to their conception.

Transform 1 average investments values were 0.670, 0.539, 0.761 and 0.531 in treatments A, B, C and D respectively (0.669 overall); the corresponding numbers for Transform 2 were 0.913, 0.752, 0.880 and 0.735 (0.803 overall) and, it will be recalled, 0.686, 0.611, 0.706 and 0.683 (0.669 overall) for the observed data. So the transformed models meet the primary target of hitting average investment values much closer to home, although Transform 2 has a systematic tendency of overshooting the target. Table 4 contrasts the empirical fit of the baseline model with that of Transform 1 and 2. Transform 1 predicts roughly 2/3 of the choices (0.656), and Transform 2 slightly more (0.714). The best performance is for Transform 2 in part 1 (close to 0.8), but this deteriorates noticeably in moving to the experienced subjects of part 2. At any rate, both models predict better than 50% chance success in all sessions (*P* < 0.005). These results are encouraging, but they do not answer the question of whether they are simply a by-product of fitting the key stylized fact of the frequent occurrence of high investment with small progress gaps.

If errors are unsystematic and of plausible size, then, for *ε* = 1/5, we should be able to fit many subjects in one of the three model types (baseline, Transform 1 or Transform 2); as before, we also consider *ε* = 1/3. Table 5 summarizes the outcomes of this analysis.

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9 If the subjects’ choices can lead her to be classified as one of two or three types for a given *ε* threshold (1/5 or 1/3), we assume that she is classified as belonging to the ‘best fitting’ type, i.e. the one that requires the lowest *ε* value to rationalize her choices.
### Table 5
Classification of players by types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Error Threshold $\epsilon = 1/5$</th>
<th>Error Threshold $\epsilon = 1/3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types Based on All Choices</strong></td>
<td><strong>Types Based on All Choices</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Condition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform 1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform 2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Types Based on Parts 2 and 3 Choices Only** | **Types Based on Parts 2 and 3 Choices Only** |
| **Condition**                            | **Condition**                            |
| Model                                     | **B** | **C** | **D** | **P** | Total |
| Baseline                                  | 0.03  | 0.03  | 0     | 0.603 | 0.022 |
| Transform 1                               | 0.2   | 0.03  | 0.37  | 0.006 | 0.2   |
| Transform 2                               | 0.1   | 0.17  | 0.1   | 0.664 | 0.122 |

Percentage of players (out of 90) whose choices best fit one of the three models while allowing less than an $\epsilon$ (for $\epsilon = 1/5$ or $1/3$) error rate. $\text{P}$ values are two-tailed and provide the significance level of Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric tests for the equality of percentages across conditions. Condition B (C, D) had treatment B (C, D, respectively) in stages 1-4 and 7-10; stages 5 and 6 always had treatment A.

If we use $\epsilon = 1/3$ and if we classify subjects on the basis of all their choices, although the baseline model can only fit about 6% of the subjects, once the payoff transformations are considered a full 83% of the subjects can be fitted. If we restrict ourselves to the data from parts 2 and 3 (stages 5-10), the performance of Transform 2 has a large drop not adequately compensated by the other two algorithms, leading to a drop in fit by 10%. The apparent success of our mixed model may simply reflect the fact that chance performance is 50%, the generosity of allowing mistakes for one choice out of three, and the ex post fitting of high investment values. Aggregate performance deteriorates to 74.4% if classification is made on the basis of only parts 2 and 3. If a more plausible $\epsilon = 1/5$ criterion is used, the percentage of fitted subjects drops to just roughly one out of three.  

---

10 Suggestive evidence from Kruskal-Wallis tests, reported in the table, also suggests frequent instability in the fraction of subjects that can be classified as belonging to a given player type, depending on the experimental condition. The evidence is only suggestive, of course, since it does not take into account the possible non-independence of behaviour by subjects within the same session.
4. Conclusion

Indefinite and stochastic R&D races with multiple prizes are a good description of real-world R&D contests typically involving gradual innovations. We ran an experiment where we examined behaviour in four variants of such races, using Hörner's (2004) general framework for thinking about perpetual races. The experiment was designed to reduce (as far as possible) the cognitive requirements on the side of the subjects.

With theoretical predictions serving as benchmarks for what strategic behaviour to expect, we found that strategic motives alone do not provide an adequate explanation for observed behaviour. Specifically, we found that behaviour was less context-sensitive than the theory predicted: in all our treatments except the control treatment where low investment was always predicted, it was the case that technological competition tended to evolve into an R&D leadership monopoly: a market structure with an entrenched leadership and lower aggregate investment than if competitors would remain neck-and-neck.

This conclusion holds regardless of the other general empirical finding that aggregate investment was, on average, higher than theory predicted, possibly due to a rivalry motive. Further research, for example varying the number of R&D competitors, reconsidering modeling assumptions, and analyzing welfare and policy implications, seems warranted.

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11 While its nature as an ex post rationalization of an experimental data pattern makes us unwilling to place too much emphasis on a rivalry motive, Brenner (1987) has a discussion of how it can make competition desirable to increase R&D innovation. We have shown, however, that such competition in R&D activity is unlikely to thrive for long in the kind of perpetual R&D race environment analyzed in this paper.
Appendix A – Experimental Instructions

This is the English version of the experimental instructions. The experimental instructions used in the actual experiment were in German, and are available from the authors upon request.

General Instructions

You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making. The experiment is divided into a number of stages, and each stage is divided into rounds. During the experiment you will earn experimental points. At the start of each stage you are assigned an initial endowment of 8 experimental points. Each experimental point you earn in the experiment is worth €1.

At the end of the experiment, a winning stage will be randomly chosen by the computer. Your final payment will be equal to what you earn in the winning stage. You will not know which stage is the winning stage until the end of the experiment.

There are 10 participants in the experiment. Each round you choose actions that could affect your earnings and those of a single co-participant, and similarly he or she takes actions that could affect your earnings and his or hers. At the start of each stage, your co-participant will be chosen at random among all other participants. Once chosen, the co-participant remains the same throughout the stage. At the start of the following stage, however, your co-participant will again be chosen at random. You will not be told who your co-participant is.

The number of rounds in each stage is determined as follows. There is one chance out of ten (that is, a 10% probability) that the stage you are in terminates at the end of each round. If the stage does not terminate, you simply move on to the next round. Therefore, you will not know how many rounds there are in a stage until it terminates, and this could vary from stage to stage.

Your Decision

Each round you need to decide whether to make a low investment or a high investment. The cost of making a low investment is 0 points. The cost of making a high investment is 1 point. These costs remain the same throughout the experiment. The costs will come out of the earnings that you have in the stage.

The investment is necessary to make progress steps. You can make up to one progress step each round. The progress steps you have made accumulate as the stage proceeds. The computer display shows the number of progress steps that you, and your co-participant, have made so far in the stage.

When you choose a high investment, there is a higher probability that your investment is successful than if you choose a low investment. The probabilities of success for a low and for a high investment stay constant throughout each stage and are displayed on the computer screen. You are informed at the end of each round whether your investment is successful or
not. If your investment is successful for a given round, you move forward by one progress step.

To choose a low investment for the round, click the "Low Investment" button and then, if you are sure of your choice, the "Confirm" button. To choose a high investment for the round, click the "High Investment button" and then, if you are sure of your choice, the "Confirm" button.

After both you and your co-participant have made your choices, the computer checks whether, so far in the stage, you have accumulated more progress steps than your co-participant or otherwise:
1. If you have accumulated more progress steps than your co-participant, you get a high prize and your co-participant gets a low prize. The low prize is worth 1 point. The high prize is worth 2 points.
2. If you have accumulated the same number of progress steps as your co-participant, the computer will decide randomly who gets the high prize and who gets the low prize, and so there is a 50% probability that you get the low prize and a 50% probability that you get the high prize.
3. If you have accumulated less progress steps than your co-participant, you get the low prize and your co-participant gets the high prize.

New prizes get assigned every round. Low prizes are always worth 1 point, and High prizes are always worth 2 points. The cost of making a low investment is always 0 points, and the cost of making a high investment is always 1 point.

The number of progress steps and points earned from prizes starts from 0 points, and the initial endowment starts at 8 points, at the beginning of each stage. The probabilities of success may, or may not, change as you move from one stage to the next.

Before starting stage 1, we ask you to answer a brief questionnaire, with the only purpose of checking whether you have understood the instructions. Raise your hand when you have completed the questionnaire.

Many thanks for your participation to the experiment.

Please raise your hand if you have any questions.

Appendix B – Payoff Transformations and Rivalry Motive

Reinterpret monetary payoffs (profits) as subjective utility $\Pi_i$ in relation to agent $i$ and consider three kinds of payoff transformations, namely additive envy, ratio envy and direct envy:\(^{12}\)

\[
\Pi_i = \pi_i + \beta (\pi_i - \pi_j) \quad \beta \in (0, 1) \quad \text{(additive envy)}
\]

\[
\Pi_i = \pi_i + \beta (\pi_i / \pi_j) \quad \beta \in (0, 1) \quad \text{(ratio envy)}
\]

\[
\Pi_i = \pi_i + \beta \pi_j \quad \beta \in [-1, 0] \quad \text{(direct envy)}
\]

\(^{12}\)Zizzo (2000) contains an overview of the literature on envy.
For each of the three models, we considered $\beta$ values in the 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1 interval and computed corresponding $R/c$ values. The additive transformation is allowed the largest increase in $R/c$ value, up to 1.5 for $\beta = 1$; whereas $\beta = 1$ yields an $R/c$ value of 1.25 and 1 in the ratio envy and direct envy transformations, respectively.

We tried to compute the pure symmetric equilibrium strategy for the full grid of 10 $\beta$ values $\times$ 3 transformations $\times$ 4 treatments. However, pure symmetric equilibrium strategies for all four treatments are defined in only six cases: namely, with $\beta = 0.7$, 0.8, 0.9 and 1 for the additive transformations (mapped into $R/c$ values equal to 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 respectively) and with $\beta = 0.9$ and 1 for the ratio transformation (mapped into $R/c$ values equal to 1.175 and 1.25 respectively). Moreover, all six of these cases lead to the same equilibrium strategy, which we label Transform 1 in the main text.

We also estimated $R/c$ values equal to 1.5, 2, 3 and 4, corresponding to a (stronger) rivalry motive. The first two values do not yield symmetric pure equilibrium strategies for all four treatments. The last two do, and their strategies are identical except for $a = -2$ and +3, where, unlike $R/c = 3$, $R/c = 4$ predicts high investment. Given that for this treatment Spearman $\rho$ (high investment predicted, high investment observed) = 0.225 for $R/c = 3$ but only 0.089 for $R/c = 4$, and that the two models have perfectly multicollinear predictions otherwise, we decided to discard $R/c = 4$ and treat $R/c = 3$ as our Transform 2 model in the main text. For an informal discussion of the rivalry motive in business contexts, see Brenner (1987).

**Appendix C – Rationalizability and Payoff-Transformed Models**

We checked the rationalizability of high and low investment under Transform 1 and 2 for $a = -5$, ... +5. We found that very few restrictions are placed in this range (which includes 97.5% of relative positions actually faced by the subjects in the experiment). High investment is not rationalizable only
in treatment B, in relation to \( o = 4, 5, -4, -5 \) for both Transform 1 and 2 and also \( o = 2, 3 \) for Transform 2 only. Low investment is always rationalizable under both the baseline model and Transform 1, but, in relation to Transform 2, it is not rationalizable under \( o = -1, 0, 1 \) in treatment A and also under \( o = -2, -3 \) in treatment 2. On the basis of this analysis, Table 6 classifies average high or low investment according to whether it is rationalizable.

**Table 6**
Percentage of high investment choices and rationalizability in the extended model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transform 1 Model</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>All Treatments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rationalizability</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of high investment</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform 2 Model</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>All Treatments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalizability</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of high investment</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform 2 Model</td>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>All Treatments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalizability</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of low investment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>0.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values are the percentages of high (low) investment choices (made under relative position \( o \) in the range \(-5, ..., 5\)) classified according to treatment and to whether high (low) investment is rationalizable in the extended models. Low investment is always rationalizable in the Transform 1 model.

The anomaly of high investment in treatment A, observed with the baseline model, has now been addressed at least to the extent that high investment is always rationalizable. In addition, in treatments A and B, lower
investment is observed under Transform 2 when low investment is not rationalizable ($P < 0.001$).\footnote{Statistical significance can be obtained not just in univariate tests but also, as for the corresponding $P$ values in the main text, by using suitable logistical regressions that control for session level and individual level random effects.}

REFERENCES


