Centre for Competition Policy
High quality independent research into competition policy and regulation
Working Paper 12-12
Culling the Quangos: When is Delegation Revoked?
AUTHORS: Stephen Greasley & Chris Hanretty
ABSTRACT: We investigate the lifespan and risk of termination of 790 arm’s length agencies in the United Kingdom over the period 1985 - 2008. We hypothesise that the risk of termination will depend on three groups of factors: factors relating to the rationales for the initial delegation of power to the arm’s length agency and the form of delegation; factors relating to the policy position of the government; and factors relating to the economy. We find that agencies which have a regulatory function (particularly an economic regulation function), and those designed to ensure probity of decision-making are less likely to be terminated in any given year. Agencies structured as executive non-departmental public bodies and non-ministerial departments are also longer-lived than others. Agencies operating under right-wing governments and under heavily indebted governments are more likely to be terminated, although left-wg governments are more sensitive to the effects of debt.
CITATION: Greasley, S. & Hanretty, C. (2012) 'Culling the Quangos: When is Delegation Revoked?', CCP Working Paper 12-12
Publication Links
New Publications
CCP Book
Behavioural Economics in Competition and Consumer Policy
Subscription Members
The following organisations are subscribed to the CCP Membership Scheme and their support is gratefully acknowledged
[Membership of this scheme or use of members’ logos does not imply agreement by those organisations with any of the views or ideas published by CCP or any of its staff and students]
