18 Jun 2009

18-19 June 2009, University of East Anglia, Norwich

CCPs fifth annual conference was another roaring success, with around 85 delegates from all over the world attending the two-day event at UEAs Drama Studio.

Some presentations focused solely on the cartel problem by asking how are successful cartels organised and how do they overcome the problem of monitoring what fellow conspirators do? What are the harms from cartel activity and how do we measure this? And, what are the roles and effects of compliance programmes? Some looked at tacit collusion and the problems caused by various features such as cost asymmetries, transparency, hub and spoke agreements and contract bidding, whilst others were directed on the interface between the two, in particular on the role of firm numbers and on asymmetries in size.

Several papers used experimental methods to explore the role of excess capacity, of leniency programmes, of bargaining within the cartel, and of communication and renegotiation among cartel members.

Conference Programme

Day 1, Thursday 18 June 2009

Session 1: Cartels

Maarten Pieter Schinkel, University of Amsterdam: "Cartel Damages: On The Commissions Call for Simplified Rules on Estimating the Loss" ()

Maggie Levenstein, University of Michigan: "Determinants of Cartel Duration and the Role of Cartel Organization" (full paper)

Joe Harrington, Johns Hopkins University: "Collusion with Monitoring Based on Self-Reported Sales"

Session 2: Tacit Collusion

David Gilo, Tel Aviv University: "Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion under Cost Asymmetries"

Christian Schultz, University of Copenhagen: "Transparency on Both Sides of the Market and Tacit Collusion"

Okeoghene Odudu, Cambridge University: "The Hub and Spoke Agreement: ABC Collusion"

Rob Porter, Northwestern University: "Competition or Collusion in Recent Offshore Oil and Gas Bidding?"

Day 2, Friday 19 June 2009

Session 3: Experimental Research on Collusion

Hans Theo Normann, Goethe University: "Excess Capacity and Collusion in Bertrand-Edgeworth Markets: Experimental Evidence"

Jeroen Hinloopen, University of Amsterdam: "Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity and the Effectiveness of Leniency Programs in Experimental Auctions"

Kai-Uwe Kühn, University of Michigan: "Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion"

Session 4: Overview of Research on Collusion in CCP

Robert Sugden, CCP & School of Economics, UEA: "Salience and Tacit Collusion"

Andreas Stephan, CCP & Norwich Law School, UEA: "Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes May Be Ineffective at Preventing Cartels"

Stephen Davies. CCP & School of Economics, UEA: "Tacit versus Overt Collusion: Firm Size Asymmetries and Numbers"

Rt. Hon. Charles Clarke, MP for Norwich South, also addressed the audience: he was a a member of the cabinet when the UK Enterprise Act 2004 criminalised cartels (i.e. ringleaders could from then on be sent to prison), and he spoke about the political context for that decision.