28 Jun 2005
28-29 June 2005, University of East Anglia, Norwich
Issues surrounding the delegation of authority to non-majoritarian institutions such as regulatory agencies, competition authorities and independent central banks were discussed and debated at a two-day conference organised by the Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia on 28 and 29 June 2005.
The conference heard a series of distinguished speakers explore the question of credibility in relation to different types of non-majoritarian institution in a variety of institutional settings and contrasting geographical contexts. Giandomenico Majone distinguished between agents to whom partial decision-making authority is delegated, and trustees who are granted full decision-making power. In the first case, he argued, the challenge is to discover how best to minimise agency costs; in the second, where the relationship is fiduciary, the question is how best to ensure accountability.
The second speaker, Fabrizio Gilardi was concerned with the conditions that give rise to independence and argued that the literature on veto players offers valuable insights. His discussion explored the differences between regulatory agencies and central banks and sought to identify the sources of these differences. Roger Noll, Stanford, brought the first day to a close, with a detailed examination of what makes credibility possible. Drawing on the experience of African states in telecommunications, he considered the challenge faced by regulatory agencies attempting to develop credibility in political systems where credibility is in short supply and where even the finest institutional design may not be sufficient to deliver independent decision making.
The second day was opened by William E. Kovacic. Challenging the conventional wisdom and periodisation concerning the performance of anti-trust regulators in the USA, he identified the strategies that are necessary for a competition authority to establish, retain and increase its credibility. Imelda Maher noted the challenge posed for the rule of law by the exercise of discretionary power. In her presentation, she considered the role of law as a factor contributing to the credibility of competition authorities and its relationship to effectiveness. She also touched on the existence of international networks of competition authorities as a source of credibility.
Erik Jones addressed the issue of credibility in relation to the European Central Bank. Asserting that credibility is best seen as an argument rather than an attribute, he looked at how successive Presidents have understood the term and how they have sought to establish personal and institutional credibility.The final presentation was made by CCPs Lindsay Stirton and Michael Harker. Addressing the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts over the exercise of executive powers by regulatory authorities, they examined how far the dominant theoretical framework, which emerged in the US, can be applied in the UKs very different constitutional context.