Authors:
Michael Kummer, Franco Mariuzzo and Junjun Zhang
Date:
26 Mar 2026
Abstract
This chapter studies the non-price effects of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in the U.S. Google Play Store (2015–2019). Using 1,387 M&As involving United States (US) developers in 2016–2017 and combining matching with a staggered Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design, we show that consolidation reallocates developer effort from portfolio expansion toward within-portfolio optimization. After M&As, developers reduce entry and external growth while increasing maintenance and incremental improvement of existing products, leading to lower portfolio turnover. These effects are driven mainly by acquisitions rather than mergers and are stronger for non-horizontal transactions, consistent with a shift toward intensive-margin incentives. Price responses are economically small and limited to few paid apps, indicating that competitive effects operate predominantly through non-price channels.
